

## **Afghanistan Withdrawal June 2011:**

*This White Paper proposes practical strategies to make Counterinsurgency (COIN), High Intensity Drug Areas (HIDTA), and Indigenous Business Growth goals and objectives of General Petraeus [General Allen] and General Flynn fully operational. It tells how the U.S. team can enable Afghan leaders to make significant and measurable progress toward the goals by 2013, thereby fulfilling key National Security 911 Commission Report recommendations. (See Below)*

**Bruce J. Moran**

***07/16/11 Revision***

- I: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES:**
- II. EMPOWERING AFGHANISTAN TO ADDRESS DRUGS & CRIME:**
- III. AFGHANISTAN CROSS-BORDER THREATS AND STRATEGIES:**
- IV. MODERNIZING AFGHAN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND PUBLIC SAFETY INSTITUTIONS**
- V. REDISCOVERING BOTTOM-UP NATIONAL MARKETS AND CROSS BORDER FLOWS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN**

### **911 Commission Report Excerpt**

*“The United States and the international community should make a long term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives.”*

## Afghanistan Withdrawal 2011: ISSUE, RATIONALE & BOTTOM LINE

**ISSUE:** *How will the United States draw down troops in Afghanistan while accomplishing its principal goal of denying hostile al Qaeda or Taliban forces the capability of striking civilians in Afghanistan or America? The answer requires a U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that establishes "real time" INTEL/SECURITY operations and frees up market flows between local, municipal and regional hubs. The winning strategy must equip and enable provincial and national governors to keep lives and families of ordinary Afghans safe -- so they can live securely and earn their daily food. Doing so will capture the largely unknown secret of the Marshall Plan's success. With food and safety assured, ordinary people will support their mayors and governors, who interact with Afghan military and police forces to secure the territory and keep trade channels open.*

*A key issue is, how do Coalition forces convert current military operations in order to induce and spur Afghan local leaders to provide the safety and personal security that Afghan villagers require and want? By focusing their efforts to secure lives and homes of villagers and towns people and safety for local businesses, the Coalition can diminish civil unrest, anti-American sentiment and distrust of American troops. Also, the Coalition can redirect and guide Afghan authorities to apply scientific, industrial and managerial technology to build robust, value chain regional and national market systems which Afghan rural and towns people will use to meet daily food needs and earn their livelihoods.*

**RATIONALE:** *In a 2 ½ to 3 year window, American Strategists should work with Afghan government leaders to use SMART POWER to create conditions for restructuring: a) commerce and national markets; b) INTEL communications and SECURITY, and c) interactive governance where individual capabilities, economic freedom and industry reign and citizen pride and self-respect is a reality. As Afghan leaders establish these conditions, they support the Afghan Military and Police missions to offset and counter al-Qaeda, Taliban terrorists and the "shadow government."*

*A SMART POWER Initiative is essential and vital for General*

## ***Afghanistan Withdrawal 2011: ISSUE, RATIONALE & BOTTOM LINE***

### ***RATIONALE (CONTINUED):***

*Petraeus's [General Allen's] and General Flynn's COIN\* & HIDTA,\*\* Business, and Economic Development strategical and tactical operations mission by filling in the critical gaps and hollows which exist for intelligence gathering, distribution, analysis and follow-up. The Initiative provides a sound and practical framework for: a) the clear, hold & build operations, b) the reintegration and reconciliation efforts c) the INTEL business, economic development and revitalization critical for establishing Civil Order and d) a cohesive INTEL framework for containment and stabilization efforts. This Initiative looks at the long view with a larger germane Afghan safety, security, economic and inter-government framework for successes.*

*\*COIN = Counterinsurgency*

*\*\* HIDTA = High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas*

***BOTTOM LINE:*** *The United States must mount a cost-effective SMART POWER Initiative that enables Afghans to turn the tide. In terms of costs and returns, the Initiative will be highly economical. But first it must cast aside programs that are known to be failing, ineffective, or unsustainable. We are out of money to pour down the wrong holes. Afghanistan's population centers, borders and each key province must become secure enough to have the Afghan people feel safe, secure, and able to work to earn their daily food. They must not be compromised or strong-armed. They must be protected from bending to the will of "shadow government" or puppet leaders who are indirectly or directly influenced by criminals, drug lords, insurgents, al-Qaeda or Taliban terrorists.*

*U.S. indicators and measures must show that the economic arm of American Foreign Policy is in full force to help Afghan leaders create conditions that spread entrepreneurship, promote value change industry and commerce between town and country and across borders, and build jobs in the private sector. As Afghanistan's economy and body politic grow from these systemic, grass-roots ventures, the country will escape the fate of becoming a permanent failed state. In the region Afghanistan will become a nation to be emulated.*

***Afghanistan Withdrawal 2011:***  
***ISSUE, RATIONALE & BOTTOM LINE***

-----  
*The Strategic Planning Initiatives team gives briefings on White Papers, Initiatives, and Action Plans to public officials, such as the Pentagon, State Department, Department of Commerce, USTR, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Joint Economic Committee, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the Senate Intelligence Committee and the U.S. House Committee On Foreign Affairs [House International Relations Committee].*  
-----

*In writing this White Paper, the author collaborated with Frances Brigham Johnson, Co-Chair, Strategic Planning Initiatives. In 1950 she was a member of the Marshall Plan Central Secretariat in the Economic Cooperation Administration, Office of the Administrator, Paul Hoffman, who reported directly to President Truman. After analyzing and prioritizing all cable communications between ECA Washington Headquarters, Paris and 17 country missions, she wrote daily journals to keep key decision makers apprised of major economic reform issues, problems and solutions as they evolved.*

## **Afghanistan Withdrawal June 2011 White Paper**

*With overall military, diplomatic, information and economic strategies and plans for withdrawal being formulated, these critical & urgent indepth questions center on: a) How will we reach the U.S. National Security goal of demobilizing al-Qaeda and the Taliban terrorists, b) What will we leave behind, c) What will have been left undone and d) Within the pace of withdrawal, how far can Afghans shift gears to create a security, stability and general prosperity foundation?:*

### **I: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES:**

*Are we accomplishing our U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES in Afghanistan with Counterinsurgency, Geopolitical and Security operations which deny a safe haven to Al-qaeda and Taliban terrorists?*

*1) How will we bring stability or provincial containment to Afghanistan with use of SMART POWER while routing out criminals, drug / arms dealers, Taliban and al-Qaeda who directly or indirectly support “shadow provincial governments?” To what degree are our strategies: a) effectively working together b) working at cross purposes or c) partially, substantially or wholly successfully working with regard to military, diplomatic, information and economic programs? What steps are being made for Afghans to secure borders and overall safety/security for each province?*

*a) How is our SMART POWER policy for each province now generating Afghan citizenry confidence and trust so that Coalition and Afghan forces will keep ordinary Afghans safe in their daily activities, including home building, local commerce, daily food supply, national markets, cross-border trade and capital formation? These SMART POWER efforts counter and offset the widespread corruption, drug/arms trafficking, shadow government and the larger Taliban and al-Qaeda influences.*

*b) Do we have a provincial SMART POWER policy whose effort generates a sovereign and self-reliant Afghan citizenry while helping create stability and respect for Afghan governments: local, rural, provincial and national? These SMART POWER efforts counter and offset the widespread corruption, drug/arms trafficking, shadow government and the larger Taliban and al-Qaeda influences.*

*How can Afghan civil officials be equipped to oversee and orchestrate Afghan systems of Law & Order?*

**I: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES (CONTINUED):**

**Coalition Urged To Revamp Intelligence Gathering...**

**Walter Pincus WP 01/06/10 [excerpts]**

**General Flynn: INTEL MARGINALLY RELEVANT**

***“The highest-ranking U.S. military intelligence officer in Afghanistan has called for a major restructuring of the intelligence gathering and distribution... the present system "is only marginally relevant...”***

***“Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn... more resources should go toward gathering facts about the political, economic and cultural environment of the population...”***

***“He said... that U.S. intelligence efforts are "ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the power brokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects . . . and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers.”***

***c) Through our social networking system, have we established sufficient “real time” on-the-ground intelligence in the local areas for Afghan military and police that will provide germane intel/security and help predict criminal, insurgent, terrorist, and drug/arms trafficking activities? How and to what extent has this not been or been done in each province and major city – so the Afghan military and police can take over?***

***d) Who has been taking inventory for intelligence gaps and hollows; and who will gather and appraise the apparatus for intelligence to make these Afghanistan operations successful? How and to what extent do these findings serve to build an operations base and knowledge of missing technical assistance to open doors for local Afghans to take part in village, town and provincial enterprises and market networks critical for securing lives, food supply, homes, and livelihoods. These efforts counter and offset the widespread corruption, drug and arms dealing, the shadow government’s outreach and the larger Taliban and al-Qaeda influences.***

***e) How is the U.S. Task Force for Business and Stability Operations and Joint Chiefs of Staff considering “Security & Safety First” alternatives for approving and implementing “real time”***

**I: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES (CONTINUED):**

*communications networks on the ground for the ordinary Afghan citizen's safety and security? How are Coalition "Security & Safety First" initiatives providing the ways to prioritize means to protect and assist the "average" Afghan citizen by way of User Defined Operational Picture-UDOP which is coupled with other sophisticated communications networks? In combination, these technologies synchronize, coordinate and integrate networks of data, intelligence and analysis basic to civil order, Rule of Law, Property Rights and vital commerce activity in the local, rural, and border areas of Afghan provinces. The overall effort helps establish the necessary pillars for stabilization for a Civil Opportunity Society for the Afghan government and people.*

## II. EMPOWERING AFGHANISTAN TO ADDRESS DRUGS & CRIME:

### Comments by Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky

Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

24/06/2010

*“It is perfectly clear that drugs now pose a serious threat to the world, and Afghanistan is the main origin of this threat.”*

*“Afghanistan is the global production center for opium poppy and opiates like heroin and hashish. There has been a significant rise in drug production since the U.S.-led coalition toppled the Taliban in 2001. Illicit drug trafficking in Afghanistan has more than doubled since that time. Although drug production has declined after peaking in 2007, it remains high. Drug traffickers have been relying on the same channels during this entire time. In order to stabilize the political situation in Afghanistan, the problem of drug trafficking in Afghanistan must be addressed, as most revenues from the drug trade go to the criminal organizations that undermine stability. They can only be defeated by well-organized, long-term and targeted efforts. Drugs are a serious problem for many countries, particularly Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, where the number of drug addicts has grown to three million. In the last few years, their numbers have also grown in Central Asia, which has become a transit region for drugs destined for Russia. Afghan drugs are smuggled into Europe via Iran and Turkey.”*

Commentary: During troop withdrawals how will the United States address the world threat of drugs?

### United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime 2010 Survey

*At current levels, world heroin consumption (340 tons) and seizures represent an annual flow of 430-450 tons of heroin into the global heroin market. Of that total, opium from Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic yields some 50 tons, while the rest, some 380 tons of heroin and morphine, is produced exclusively from Afghan opium. While approximately 5 tons are consumed and seized in Afghanistan, the remaining bulk of 375*



## II. EMPOWERING AFGHANISTAN TO ADDRESS DRUGS & CRIME (CONTINUED):

### United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime 2010 Survey

*tons is trafficked worldwide via routes flowing into and through the countries neighboring Afghanistan.*

*The Balkan and northern routes are the main heroin trafficking corridors linking Afghanistan to the huge markets of the Russian Federation and Western Europe. The Balkan route traverses the Islamic Republic of Iran (often via Pakistan), Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across South-East Europe to the Western European market, with an annual market value of some \$20 billion. The northern route runs mainly through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The size of that market is estimated to total \$13 billion per year.*

### Commentary:

2) *Afghanistan Drug Trade Main Threat: How are we handling the threat to Afghanistan & Pakistan stability and containment policies that are undermined through the drug trade? Being Afghanistan is the number one producer of heroin, what steps have been taken to largely mitigate the production, distribution and sale of drugs [375 tons trafficked @ approximately 33 billion dollars annually – see above] which funds the Taliban and al-Qaeda operations. We have been in Afghanistan for about ten years [U.S. Intervention October 7, 2001] which is approximately 3,500 tons @ \$330 billion dollars trafficked.*

### III. AFGHANISTAN CROSS-BORDER THREATS AND STRATEGIES:

3) Afghanistan Border: Pakistan, Iran, Azad Kashmir, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China constitute the Afghanistan border countries: If not in full operational capacity now: How should U.S. SOG teams be immediately deployed to confront cross border terrorists activities and drug / arms trade? What leadership will the Afghan government provide; and how will the initiative serve their national interests?

How should Shock Teams be dispatched to ambush, raid, gather intel, and report on the activities of the criminals, drug/arms dealers and terrorists groups? It is not enough to just cover the Afghanistan / Pakistan border to effectively stymie/halt the \$20 billion dollar per year drug trade, arms dealing and terrorists activities. How should enhanced U.S. SLAM missions be redirected in order to disrupt drug and arms trade routes and terrorists activities throughout Afghanistan's border networks and drug/arms routes to also stymie and halt the northern routes of the \$13 billion dollar drug trade per year?

How have we effectively dealt with QUD [Iranian} covert activities which must be identified, disrupted and dismantled -- so no sanctuary is given to criminals, drug /arms dealers, insurgents and terrorists? How have we reduced infiltration in which Information Operations are enhanced in border areas -- to concentrate on the nuanced operating environment (human) factors that are involved in insurgent activities, terrorist operations, arms/drug dealings, demographics, tribes, clans, class, ethnicity and key players? How do these combined strategies lead to the Afghan Military and Police having a proper and fitting means for taking over Afghanistan security to meet our Counterinsurgency/HIDTA, Geopolitical and National Security interests? Herein, how have the Afghanistan Military and Police been prepared to rapidly respond in a "real time" fashion as not to leave the Afghan citizenry feeling lost, abandoned and helpless after the "surge ends" and the Coalition forces pull out?

**IV. MODERNIZING AFGHAN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND PUBLIC SAFETY INSTITUTIONS:**

New Yorker February 14, 2011 Excerpts  
Afghan Bank Heist

*“... The [Banking] scandal is perhaps the most far-reaching in the nine years since Karzai took power...”*

*“...The investigation into Kabul Bank was run by a remarkable but little-known group of Americans working at the Embassy called the Afghan Threat Finance Cell. Their findings are considered so sensitive that almost no one—generals, diplomats, the investigators themselves—is willing to talk about them publicly. The unit, made up of agents from the F.B.I., the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Treasury Department, and the Pentagon, has compiled extensive evidence of bribery. “If this were America, fifty people would have been arrested by now,” an American official told me...”*

*“...The group was set up, in 2008, to sever the links between Taliban insurgents and their financing, much of which was believed to come from the drug trade. Instead, the investigators found that the lines connecting the Taliban and the drug smugglers often ran through the Afghan government. They also uncovered one of the darker truths of the war: the vast armies of private gunmen paid to protect American supply convoys frequently use American money to bribe Taliban fighters to stand back. These bribes are believed by officials in Kabul and in Washington to be one of the main sources of the Taliban’s income. The Americans, it turns out, are funding both sides of the war.”*

4) Key Economic Evolution: Afghanistan Banking [Transparent, Accountable and Responsible] and Public Safety Dimension:

A SMART POWER Economic Evolution transpires in Afghanistan when the banking sector is properly established to assist the local Afghanistan population-at-large to run their business operations. The Marshall Plan astutely embodies this key economic SMART POWER principle in keeping things simple, direct, and in support of local self sufficient and autonomous indigenous populations. Bridge loans, enforced Rule of Law [local Afghan law], improved property rights, and the protection of civil liberties advance these efforts in a

**IV. MODERNIZING AFGHAN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND PUBLIC SAFETY INSTITUTIONS (CONTINUED):**

**4) Key Economic Evolution: Afghanistan Banking [Transparent, Accountable and Responsible] and Public Safety Dimension:**

*transitional economy. Also, what Afghan measures are underway for establishing and maintaining vital artery trading hubs and sustaining major links to keep commerce alive, active and well?*

*Counterinsurgency, Diplomacy and Information strategies are only successful when the local indigenous population can trust and believe that their personal safety and trading channels are being taken care of on a daily basis. How do the Afghan people come to trust and believe in what our SMART POWER operations do to shore up official Afghan capabilities to manage and oversee such things as banks, courts, commerce and law enforcement? When working with Afghan local, officials, how have or have not SMART POWER initiatives been a game changing factor for the "ordinary Afghan" citizen's trust and belief systems? How have they provided a means for the local Afghan people to trust, feel confident and believe in the Afghanistan Military and Police? How will the provincial and national officials interact, reinforce and backup the personal safety and trading channel efforts pursued by local Afghan officials?*

*What efforts are currently underway to correct the major problems that have been seen in Afghanistan public safety and banking, such as the heavy corruption and extensive power abuse at the Kabul Bank [via CEO Khalil Ferozi and Sher Khan Farnood]?*

*When local commerce cannot thrive safely in a free enterprise arena, criminals, drug/arms dealers, insurgents, Taliban terrorists and al-Qaeda networks and the provincial "shadow governments" gain the larger upper hand in controlling the black market, underground economy and informal sector.*

## V. REDISCOVERING BOTTOM-UP NATIONAL MARKETS AND CROSS BORDER FLOWS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN:

*U.S. SMART POWER strategies are impressive. But too often American projects in Afghanistan are financially unsustainable. To continue, they will require on-going U.S. money. But the days of paying U.S. dollars for unsustainable and failing Afghan local projects are over. The United States is out of money to do that. So how can U.S. recast Counterinsurgency/HIDTA, Geopolitical and National Security tactical operations to enable Afghan local, provincial and national governors to keep lives and families of ordinary Afghans safe – so they can live securely and earn their daily food? This means empowering Afghans to live securely and earn their living by freely exchanging goods and services up and down the value chain. Doing so will capture the secret of the Marshall Plan's success.*

*How can future U.S. economic efforts be redirected to release the creative power of Afghans who themselves are quite nimble and motivated to pursue general prosperity, given safe working conditions and market outlets? The question should be raised, how do Coalition forces convert current military operations in order to induce and spur Afghan local leaders to provide the safety and personal security that Afghan villagers require and want? The Coalition, by upgrading priorities -- to secure lives and homes of villagers and safety for local businesses -- can diminish civil unrest, anti-American sentiment and distrust of American troops.*

*What indicators and measures will be set to show that the economic arm of U.S. Foreign Policy is in full force to create conditions that spread entrepreneurship, promote value chain commerce between town and country, and create private sector jobs? As Afghanistan's local economies and national markets grow thrive from such efforts, the country will escape the fate of permanent failed state status. Leaders in Sub-Sahara Africa, pressed by ambitious entrepreneurs, are going this route.*

*Why and how is U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan consistently beleaguered with top – down economic development operations? State planned, top-down projects do not directly touch the lives of work-a-day Afghans. Nor do they afford villagers and townspeople*

V. REDISCOVERING BOTTOM-UP NATIONAL MARKETS AND  
CROSS BORDER FLOWS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN  
(CONTINUED):

*personal sovereignty, independence and an autonomous self-reliant life style geared toward the free production and exchange of goods and services. Such outcomes were the finer successes of the Marshall Plan.*

*Please recall that, when launching the Marshall Plan in his June 1947 speech at Harvard, Secretary George Marshall said:*

*"The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization."*

*Focusing on this end goal, Secretary Marshall provided the seminal guideline for the European Recovery Program when it was launched in 1948. The Program focused like a rivet on freeing up production and markets while spurring countries to change economic policies and build critical infrastructure (physical and administrative) to get business going -- within countries and across national borders. The aim was to see that the people at large, through their own efforts, could safely cover their needs for daily food and pursue livelihoods of their choice.*

*Lessons of what made the Marshall Plan work have too often been overlooked, neglected or ignored by our team in Afghanistan. Yet Secretary Marshall's "First Commandment" was "Europe Must Save Itself." In like spirit, how can Americans who manage economic initiatives in Afghanistan look more often to Afghan leaders and people to shape the fortunes and future of their noble country -- by scouting out and removing obstacles to local enterprise and providing a friendly climate for business? What more can Americans do to respect and commend Afghan leaders and actors who secure and free up trade and commerce between town and country and across borders?*

*Today U.S. strategists can ask how Americans can engage with Afghan leaders, including local and provincial officials, to enable them to assure their people that homes and families will be safe and*

V. REDISCOVERING BOTTOM-UP NATIONAL MARKETS AND  
CROSS BORDER FLOWS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN  
(CONTINUED):

*food plentiful. Afghan leaders can learn what promises they can make to villagers for assured security and food. They can explore what "deals" they can arrange with newcomers, such as those from Taliban ranks, in return for security, food and loyalty. Afghan leaders can also ask their people what conditions they require in order to provide food for their families and sell traditional products into local and regional markets.*

*Will local/provincial officials defend Afghans against personal threats, abuse, and thievery as well as protect market access for their goods and services? What assurances can villagers obtain for local enforcement of basic law for personal security, trade and commerce? What agreement on transparency and freedom to report abuse by power-brokers? What do villagers offer in return, by way of support and loyalty to their governing officials?*

*Lessons for Today from the Marshall Plan*

*Gordon O.F. Johnson (CIPE Technical Paper Series - Jan. 2002)*

*"Creation of an independent Afghan economic development agency or ministry, operating with technical assistance and support from foreign advisors and auditors, will help to resolve internal differences and to separate economic power from political power."*

## CONCLUSION

*America's SMART POWER goals and objectives in Afghanistan are commendable. Yet how will U.S. strategists make the country a bulwark against al-Qaeda & Taliban terrorist subversive attacks on Afghan populations and the United States? How will current U.S. strategies keep Afghanistan from becoming a long-term failed state? What indicators and measures will we use to show that the economic arm of U.S. Foreign Policy is in full force to spur Afghans to create abundant private sector jobs, new entrepreneurs, viable daily food supplies and a sustainable, growing evolutionary economy to generate revenue to pay for public works and services in the future?*

*Today in Afghanistan, the Marshall Plan goals of personal self-sufficiency have been largely overlooked, and the Plan's practical lessons ignored. What was the Plan's key focus and end goal? Secretary George Marshall told us in his 1947 speech at Harvard when the European Recovery Program was launched. The aim was to see that the people, through their own efforts, could safely prosper and cover their own daily needs. To illustrate the point, he said:*

*"The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization."*

*Most importantly, the European Recovery Program focused like a rivet on freeing up production and markets while changing economic policies, administrative practices and infrastructure within countries and across national borders to get business going. These are the lessons of what made the Marshall Plan succeed. Secretary Marshall's "First Commandment" was "Europe Must Save Itself." In ways that reflect these reforms, Americans managing U.S. economic strategies and endeavors must continue to honor, respect and commend Afghan leaders and people as they shape the economy, direction and future of their noble country.*

*For U.S. Operations in Afghanistan, how can we help prepare "the Afghans" to live with the local and provincial officials who will govern their lives, their safety and food supplies? What "deals" can Afghans aim to reach to preserve and enhance their personal security and the safety of their families? What conditions do Afghans need to provide food for their families and sell traditional*



## CONCLUSION

*products into local and regional markets, so they can earn their livelihoods? Will local/provincial officials defend them against personal threats, abuse, and thievery as well as protect market access for their goods and services? What assurances can villagers obtain for local enforcement of basic law for personal security, trade and commerce? What agreement on transparency and freedom to report abuse? What do villagers offer in return, that is, their support and loyalty to their governing officials?*

*Any end-strategy and redeployment must purposefully build strong levels of indigenous (Afghan) trust in American forces by the populace that American soldiers will finish successfully whatever missions they undertake.*

*Can our soldiers build and sustain the trust and support of the local Afghan citizens? Is this trust and support not the biggest asset a soldier can have in fighting against enemies who hide amongst the people? If our soldiers lack that local trust, can they receive the local intelligence needed to find the bad guys and their bomb factories? Can our heavy investment in sophisticated weapons and special training offset the losses our soldiers will suffer if they are not trusted to stay long enough to protect the locals who help them?*

*In sum, does U.S. SMART POWER lack sufficient focus to evoke material change in the everyday lives of ordinary Afghans within the context of Afghanistan's local, provincial and national governing structure? Who is asking this question and evaluating answers to it? Where answers fall short, should not future SMART POWER undertakings be redirected to release the creative power of Afghanistan's people who themselves are quite able and motivated to establish general prosperity and public safety? The question should be raised and pursued, how do Coalition forces move beyond current but limited military operations to spur and enable Afghan leaders to provide the safety and personal security that Afghanistan people-at-large require and want. Redirected efforts should diminish civil unrest, anti-American sentiment and a level of distrust of American troops.*

## CONCLUSION

*To succeed with the overall "SMART POWER INITIATIVE" in 2 ½ to 3 years, American strategists must work with Afghans to create conditions for restructuring a) commerce with national markets, b) modes of "real time" INTEL/SECURITY communication, and c) interactive governance (at local, regional and national levels) where universal principles of liberty, freedom, and independence abide and self-respect is a reality. Within Afghan Rule Of Law, creation of these conditions will diminish and eventually eliminate rule by corruption and violence. This restructuring will encompass all elements of the society, including participating Taliban.*

*"Local participation in government" is not enough when ordinary people lack sufficient reason and economic motivation to stand up and turn out insurgents, terrorists, tyrants and bullies. "Government economic programs" are not enough, if controlled by entrenched power groups, special interests or corrupt government officials who use public assets to cause the people to heel.*

*Fortunately Americans have years of experience in fostering ideas and culturally attuned institutions that expand individual liberty, prosperity and economic freedom. In due time, national leaders find the innovations useful, adopt some of them, and govern with more transparency and accountability. As leaders transform their countries, step by step, friendly nations enhance the National Security of the United States, at home and abroad.*

END